

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 9 VIENNA 2914

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN

REPS APRIL 1, 1974

REF: VIENNA 2913

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL
SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS ON APRIL 1, 1974.

PARAGRAPHS 1 THROUGH 5 CONTAINING SUMMARY SENT
REFTEL.

6. KHLESTOV OPENED MEETING BY ASKING ALLIED
REPS TO LEAD OFF. ON BASIS OF POSITION APPROVED
BY AD HOC GROUP, US REP RESPONDED
THAT, AT LAST INFORMAL SESSION KHLESTOV HAD REFERRED TO
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THE FACT THAT ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAD SAID THAT THEY WANTED

TO START REDUCTIONS WITH REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES AND THAT THE ALLIES HAD GIVEN THE EAST FIGURES ON THE STRENGTH OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA. KHLESTOV AT THAT TIME HAD OBSERVED THAT THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES ON THE TWO SIDES DIFFERED. HE HAD ASKED WHAT THE ALLIES HAD IN MIND WHEN THEY USED THE TERM GROUND FORCES. HE HAD ASKED SEVERAL SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT UNITS THE WEST HAD INCLUDED IN ITS TOTAL. HE HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE EAST OUGHT TO HAVE A CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT THE ALLIES INTENDED, AND HAD ASKED IF THE ALLIES WOULD DISCUSS THIS ISSUE AT SOME LATER POINT. THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD EXPLAINED THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE WHICH THE ALLIES HAD FOLLOWED IN ESTIMATING GROUND FORCES. KHLESTOV HAD SUGGESTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE UNANIMITY OF APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES. WESTERN REPS HAD AGREED THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD KNOW WHAT THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT IN DISCUSSING GROUND FORCES. WESTERN REPS HAD ADDED THAT ALLIES HAD HAD THIS IN MIND IN PROPOSING TO DISCUSS THE ESTIMATES OF STRENGTH DATA MADE BY EACH SIDE. WESTERN REPS HAD ACCORDINGLY SUGGESTED THAT THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM AND THE DATA BE DISCUSSED TOGETHER.

7. US REP CONTINUED THAT KHLESTOV HAD AGREED THAT FIGURES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN DUE COURSE, BUT HAD SAID THAT A COMMON DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES SHOULD BE WORKED OUT FIRST IN VIEW OF THE ALLIED EMPHASIS ON GROUND FORCES. KHLESTOV HAD ASKED THE ALLIES TO AGREE TO A DISCUSSION OF A COMMON DEFINITION. WESTERN REPS HAD AGREED TO THINK THE MATTER OVER AND TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF DEFINITION WITHOUT THE USE OF NUMBERS.

8. US REP SAID WESTERN REPS HAD THOUGHT THE MATTER OVER. ALLIES STILL BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO DISCUSS THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES AND THE RELEVANT DATA TOGETHER, SO AS TO HAVE A BETTER

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UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENT POSSIBLE DEFINITIONS. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE EAST'S PERFORMANCE AND IN THE INTEREST OF SHOWING ALLIED FLEXIBILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO TRY TO REACH AGREEMENTS ON THE WAY TO PROCEED, ALLIES WERE WILLING TO PROCEED AS EASTERN REPS HAD SUGGESTED. US REP SAID ALLIES WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO THIS PROMPTLY AFTER RETURN FROM THE EASTER RECESS.

9. KHLESTOV RESPONDED THAT THE QUESTION OF DEFINING WHAT WAS MEANT BY GROUND FORCES HAD IN FACT BEEN RAISED THROUGH ALLIED INSISTENCE ON REDUCING GROUND FORCES RIGHT FROM THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON OCTOBER 31. AS FOR THE WAY OR METHOD OF DEVELOPING A DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES, AS LONG AS ONE LEFT OUT DATA OR FIGURES, THIS SHOULD BE A SIMPLE MATTER. EVERY NEGOTIATION STARTED WITH SUCH GENERAL DEFINITIONS. ONE COULD FIRST WORK OUT A DEFINITION OF WHAT IS INCLUDED IN GROUND FORCES AND THEN PROCEED TO THE FIGURES.

10. KHLESTOV SAID HE WAS SOMEWHAT SURPRISED THE ALLIED REPS WERE READY TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE ONLY FOLLOWING THE EASTER RECESS. IT WOULD SEEM TO HIM THAT PARTICIPANTS IN THE PRESENT INFORMAL SESSIONS COULD READILY SETTLE THIS QUESTION OR REFER IT TO MILITARY EXPERTS TO WORK OUT. HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT KIND OF DIFFICULTIES ALLIES HAD IN PROCEEDING DIRECTLY TO RESOLVE THIS QUESTION. THERE WAS STILL A WEEK TO GO IN THE PRESENT SESSION BEFORE THE RECESS. PARTICIPANTS WOULD USE THE RECESS TO THINK OVER POSSIBLE FUTURE STEPS IF ONE WANTED TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. IN THOSE CONDITIONS, IT WOULD BE BETTER IF, PRIOR TO THE RECESS, CLARITY COULD BE ACHIEVED ON A DEFINITION OF THE GROUND FORCES. HE WOULD THINK OF TWO POSSIBILITIES. IF THE ALLIES HAD DIFFICULTIES IN DEFINING THE GROUND FORCES ALONE, ONE COULD INSTEAD FIRST TRY TO DEFINE ALL TYPES OF FORCES, GROUND FORCES, AIR FORCES, AS WELL AS DEFINING UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IN ORDER TO GET THE FULL RANGE. THE LOGIC OF THIS APPROACH WAS TO SEE WHAT KIND OF TROOPS WOULD BE COVERED BY THIS OR
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THAT DEFINITION. DEFINITIONS OF THIS KIND WOULD NOT FORESTALL OR PREJUDGE THE QUESTION OF WHAT KIND OF TROOPS WOULD BE COVERED BY REDUCTIONS.

11. KHLESTOV SAID THE EAST COULD AGREE EITHER TO DEFINING GROUND FORCES AS SUCH OR TO MAKING AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD DEFINITION OF WHAT IS MEANT BY AIR FORCES AND UNITS EQUIPPED BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS WELL. THOSE ASKED TO CARRY OUT THIS TASK WOULD NOT HAVE TO GO INTO GREAT DETAIL. EASTERN REPS HAD ASKED THEIR MILITARY EXPERTS TO TELL THEM HOW THEY WOULD DEFINE GROUND FORCES. THE EXPERTS HAD DONE SO AND ALSO HAD PROVIDED INVENTORY LISTS OF THE AIR FORCES. FOR EXAMPLE, EASTERN MILITARY EXPERTS SAID THAT US AND USSR GROUND FORCES IN THE

REDUCTION AREA INCLUDED MECHANIZED UNITS, TANK UNITS, ARTILLERY, ROCKETS OR MISSILES AND ARMY AVIATION. THE SAME TYPE OF DEFINITION SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO THE FORCES OF THE US, FRG, UK, BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS AND OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE ONE SIDE AND THE GROUND FORCES OF USSR, POLAND, GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON THE OTHER.

12. KHRUSHCHEV CONTINUED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CARRY OUT THE SAME ANALYSIS WITH REGARD TO THE AIR FORCES OF BOTH SIDES. EASTERN MILITARY EXPERTS HAD STATED THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE

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FROM US REP MBFR

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN THE REDUCTION AREA INCLUDED TACTICAL FIGHTERS, RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AND TRANSPORT PLANES. HE DID NOT KNOW PERSONALLY WHETHER THIS WAS REALLY SO. BUT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IF EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES WOULD GO OVER THE INVENTORY LISTS OF THE AIR FORCES ON BOTH SIDES.

EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CARRY OUT THIS PROJECT BEFORE THE RECESS BECAUSE PREVIOUS DISCUSSION HAD INDICATED THAT THERE WAS A DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES AS TO WHAT WAS INCLUDED IN THE ARMED FORCES OF EACH SIDE. THIS WOULD BE A RELATIVELY SIMPLE TASK, MORE OR LESS TECHNICAL. SO IN THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT WEEK, WORK OF THE EXPERTS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED SO THAT BY THE END OF THE WEEK ONE WOULD HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WAS INVOLVED IN GROUND AND AIR FORCES. HE SUGGESTED THAT HE EXPERTS SHOULD MEET AT SOME TIME DURING THE NEXT TWO DAYS.

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13. US REP ASKED WHETHER KHLESTOV WOULD VISUALIZE THAT PARTICIPANTS IN PRESENT SESSION COULD MEET AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FOLLOWING WEEK, IF THIS COULD BE ARRANGED, PERHAPS ALONG WITH SOME EXPERTS.

14. KHLESTOV SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT WHAT HE HAD JUST SUGGESTED WAS A JOB FOR EXPERTS, NOT A JOB FOR HEADS OF DELEGATION. BUT IF ALLIED REPS BELIEVED IT NECESSARY, EAST WOULD NOT OPPOSE DISCUSSION OF THE TOPIC BY HEADS OF DELEGATION.

15. AFTER CONSULTING BRIEFLY WITH BELGIAN AND FRG REPS, US REP SAID ALLIED REPS DID BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE THAT THE ISSUE BE DISCUSSED BY HEAD OF DELEGATION BECAUSE DEFINITIONS WERE AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. PROVISIONALLY, AND SUBJECT TO THE AGREEMENT OF HIS ALLIED COLLEAGUES NOT PRESENT, PARTICIPANTS MIGHT DISCUSS GROUND FORCES AND THE ELEMENTS EACH SIDE HAD INCLUDED IN THE GROUND FORCES AND WHAT EACH SIDE THOUGHT SHOULD BE INCLUDED UNDER THAT HEADING. US REP REPEATED HE DID NOT KNOW IF HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD AGREE AND HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT WITH THEM BEFORE UNDERTAKING ANY SPECIFIC COMMITMENT TO DISCUSS THE POINT FURTHER.

16. KHLESTOV SAID EAST WAS PREPARED TO DO THIS. ALSO, IF ALLIED REPS CONSIDERED IT MORE APPROPRIATE, HE WOULD AGREE THAT THE TOPICS BE DISCUSSED BY HEADS OF DELEGATION. BUT HE WOULD PREFER THAT THE DISCUSSION TAKE PLACE ON APRIL 5. US REP SAID IT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT HE COULD RETURN FROM A TRIP TO BRUSSELS BY THAT TIME. KHLESTOV THEN AGREED THAT AN INFORMAL SESSION COULD TAKE PLACE ON APRIL 8 TO DISCUSS THE TOPIC. US REP STRESSED THAT ALLIED OFFER WAS TENTATIVE AND DEPENDENT ON VIEWS OF HIS COLLEAGUES SINCE THIS TIMING WAS MORE RAPID THAN ALLIES HAD ANTICIPATED.

17. KHLESTOV SAID HE NOW WISHED TO ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY ONE FURTHER ISSUE ARISING FROM THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING APPROACH. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, ALLIED REPS HAD INDICATED TO EAST THAT THE GROUND FORCES OF FRANCE WERE INCLUDED IN THE OVERALL FIGURES OF NATO GROUND FORCES THE ALLIES HAD GIVEN THE EAST. HE DID

NOT WISH TO REFER, IN RAISING THIS ISSUE, TO THE QUESTIONS
AS TO THE ACCURACY OF THESE FIGURES RAISED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS
BY AMBASSADOR SMIRNOVSKY. THESE QUESTIONS WERE STILL OPEN.
US REP SAID QUESTIONS OF THIS KIND WOULD BECOME MORE CLEAR
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IF THE FIGURES WERE ON THE TABLE AS ALLIES HAD PROPOSED.

18. KHLESTOV SAID HIS INTEREST WAS A DIFFERENT ONE AND DID
NOT CONCERN DATA. EAST STILL HAD SOME QUESTIONS ON DATA BUT HIS
QUESTION WAS FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF HIS OWN INTEREST AS A LAWYER.
IT WAS THIS: FRANCE WAS NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS

NONETHELESS, THE ALLIES HAD INCLUDED FRENCH GROUND FORCES IN
THEIR FIGURES. HE DID NOT KNOW HOW THE ALLIES HAD SETTLED THIS
ISSUE WITH THE FRENCH. THIS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED THE AFFAIR
OF THE ALLIES. BUT, NONETHELESS, SOMETHING WAS MISSING,
BECAUSE WHEN THINGS WERE SAID IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT A THIRD
PARTY, THIS RAISED CERTAIN QUESTION: THE EAST DID NOT KNOW WHETHER
THE FRENCH HAD AGREED TO THESE FIGURES.

19. KHLESTOV SAID HE HAD A SECOND QUESTION IN THIS REGARD:
AT THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION AND PRIOR TO THAT, ALLIED REPS
HAD SUGGESTED A COMMON CEILING OF NATO GROUND FORCES. THEY HAD
SUGGESTED A COMMON CEILING OF NATO GROUND FORCES. THEY HAD
SUGGESTED 700,000 AS AN EXAMPLE. AND ALLIED REPS HAD POINTED
OUT THAT THIS FIGURE WOULD COVER FRENCH GROUND FORCES STATIONED
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. IN SUCH A CASE, THE
QUESTION AROSE AS TO WHAT WOULD BE THE MECHANISM ASSURING THAT
THIS NUMERICAL LIMIT WOULD BE COMPLIED WITH. AFTER ALL, THE
AGREEMENT REACHED WOULD BE ONE WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE THE FRENCH
AS SIGNATORIES. IT WAS CLEAR TO EAST THAT, ACCORDING TO THE
ALLIED CONCEPT, THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD AGREE TO A COMMON
CEILING. THIS AGREEMENT WOULD CONSTITUTE A LEGAL OBLIGATION ON
THEIR PART. AT THE PRESENT TIME, FRANCE WAS NOT PARTICIPATING
IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IF THE ALLIES BELIEVED THAT FRANCE MIGHT
AT SOME FUTURE POINT BECOME A SIGNATORY, THAT MIGHT BE ONE WAY
TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE HE HAD RAISED. IF NOT, FRANCE WOULD BE
AT LIBERTY TO ACT AS IT WISHED WITH REGARD TO ITS FORCES
IN THE FRG. THIS WAS THE LOGIC OF THE SITUATION. KHLESTOV
SAID HE CONSIDERED THIS QUESTION A FAIR ONE, BECAUSE THE COMMON
CEILING WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS.

20. FRG REP SAID HE DID NOT THINK THE ISSUE JUST RAISED BY
KHLESTOV INDICATED THE EXISTENCE OF A REAL PROBLEM. AS ALLIED
REPS HAD SAID, THE FIGURES THEY HAD GIVEN THE EAST FOR GROUND
FORCES INCLUDED FRENCH GROUND FORCES STATIONED IN THE FRG.

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FRANCE WAS A MEMBER OF NATO AND SINCE ALLIED FIGURES COVERED
AL GROUND FORCES OF ALLIED COUNTRIES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS,

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FROM US REP MBFR

IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE ALLIES HAD HAD TO INCLUDE FRENCH
GROUND FORCES. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE THAT
THE FIGURES GIVEN BY ALLIED REPS TO THE EAST INCLUDED
FRENCH GROUND FORCES IN THE FRG. THE QUESTION AS TO
WHETHER FRANCE HAS AGREED TO THIS FIGURE DID NOT
ARISE SINCE FRANCE WAS NOT A PARTICIPANT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
AND THEREFORE HAD NO COMMITMENT TO GIVE ITS
VIEWS ON ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITIONS AND TACTICS.

21. FRG REP SAID THAT AS TO SECOND QUESTION RAISED
BY KHLESTOV, AS KHLESTOV HAD MENTIONED, ALLIED REPS

HAD SUGGESTED A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES, WHICH
COULD BE SET AT 700,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE. SUCH A
CEILING ON EACH SIDE WOULD BE AN OVERALL CEILING.
PARTICIPANTS IN A FUTURE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE A JOINT
OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THAT THIS COMMON CEILING COVERING
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GROUND FORCES WAS RESPECTED. SINCE IT WOULD BE AN OVERALL
CEILING, THIS WOULD BE A WHOLLY FEASIBLE UNDERTAKING
EVEN THOUGH FRANCE WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE ANY OBLIGATION
SINCE IT WOULD NOT BE A PARTICIPANT.

22. KHLESTOV ASKED, WHAT IF FRENCH DECIDED TO
DEVELOP THE STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES IN THE FRG AND PERHAPS
PLACE 50,000 MORE MEN THERE? WHERE WERE THE LEGAL ASSURANCES
THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT DO THIS? IF FRANCE WERE NOT PARTY TO AN
AGREEMENT, IT WOULD BE FREE TO ACT AS IT DESIRED. THE PARTICI-
PANTS IN AN AGREEMENT WOULD ASSUME LEGAL OBLIGATIONS.
IT WAS POSSIBLE TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS THAT A THIRD PARTY WOULD
DEMONSTRATE GOOD WILL, BUT THIS WOULD NOT BE LEGALLY BINDING.
DISCUSSION AT PRESENT WAS ABOUT A POSSIBLE LEGAL
COMMITMENT TO BE WORKED OUT BY THE PARTICIPANTS AND
ITS PERFORMANCE ENSURED BY ALL PARTIES TO AN AGREEMENT. IT WHAT
WAY WOULD IT BE INDICATED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD NOT
EXCEED THE OVERALL CEILING FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS?

23. FRG REP SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WAS VERY
USEFUL TO DISCUSS WHAT THE FRENCH WOULD DO. FRANCE
WAS NOT A PARTICIPANT IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS AND
IT COULD BE ASSUMED THAT IT WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN
AGREEMENTS OR ASSUME ANY COMMITMENTS. THIS
WAS A FACT AND IT COULD NOT BE HELPED. IT WAS TRUE
THAT, AS A CONSEQUENCE, FRANCE WOULD NOT HAVE UNDERTAKEN
ANY COMMITMENT VIS-A-VIS THE WARSAW PACT AS TO THE
NUMBER OF FORCES IT MAINTAINED IN THE FRG. BUT
THIS WAS NO PROBLEM BECAUSE THE ALLIES WOULD
COMMIT THEMSELVES IF THE EAST ACCEPTED THE COMMON
CEILING TO HAVE, FOR EXAMPLE, NO MORE THAN 700,000
GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA, INCLUDING FRENCH FORCES
AND REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY FRENCH FORCES THERE
WERE. BELGIAN REP SAID THE QUESTION POSED BY KHLESTOV HAD TWO
ASPECTS: THE FIRST WAS HOW PARTICIPANTS WERE GOING
TO RESPECT A COMMON CEILING AND THE SECOND WAS HOW
THE COMMON CEILING WOULD BE MAINTAINED IN PRACTICE. AS REGARDS
THE SECOND ASPECT, HOW TO ARRANGE THINGS IN THE PRACTICAL
SENSE SO THAT THE LEVEL OF ALLIED FORCES WOULD REMAIN
THE SAME UNDER A COMMON CEILING NO MATTER WHAT THE
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FRENCH DID. FRG REP SAID THIS WAS AN INTERNAL PROBLEM FOR THE NATO ALLIES. THE ALLIES WERE PERFECTLY AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE PROBLEM.

24. KHLESTOV SAID HE WAS MERELY TRYING TO UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION SINCE IT WAS CLEAR THAT A COUNTRY WHICH WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN AN AGREEMENT UNDERTOOK NO OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN IT. BUT ALLIED APPROACH APPARENTLY FORESAW SOME OBLIGATION BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND THE FRENCH. BELGIAN REP SAID THIS WOULD NOT BE AN OBLIGATION, BUT AN ARRANGEMENT. KHLESTOV SAID THIS QUESTION MIGHT BE AN ASPECT OF THE ALLIED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FRENCH, BUT IT WAS ALSO A LEGITIMATE INTEREST FOR THE EAST. IF ALLIED REPS WERE SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE THE WESTERN OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THE COMMON CEILING WAS MAINTAINED AND TO ELABORATE THEIR OWN ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE FRENCH, THIS WAS ONE POSSIBILITY. HE MERELY WISHED TO UNDERSTAND THE ALLIED APPROACH. BELGIAN REP SAID THIS WAS PURELY A PRACTICAL ISSUE. FRG REP SAID THAT IN THE UNLIKELY SITUATION THAT THE FRENCH WISHED TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA, SAY BY 50,000, THE ALLIES WOULD NOT COME TO THE EAST AND SAY THEY WANTED TO INCREASE THE OVERALL LEVEL OF THEIR FORCES BY AN ADDITIONAL 50,000. THE WEST WOULD RESPECT THE COMMON CEILING REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY FRENCH FORCES THERE WERE IN THE FRG.

25. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, ON THE BASIS OF HISTORICAL PRECEDENT, EAST KNEW THAT THIS WAS A KIND OF SITUATION WHERE WEST WOULD BE UNDERTAKING AN OBLIGATION WHOSE FULFILLMENT WOULD DEPEND ON A THIRD COUNTRY NOT A PARTY TO AN AGREEMENT. SINCE BY THEIR COMMITMENT, ALLIES INDICATED RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO SETTLE THE MATTER WITH THE FRENCH, A CONCLUSIVE AGREEMENT EVENTUALLY WOULD THEN STILL DEPEND UPON AN AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE. WHAT IF FRENCH WOULD NOT AGREE TO ACCEPT THESE LIMITATIONS?

26. FRG REP SAID THIS WAS AN INTERNAL PROBLEM WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND THERE WERE MANY WAYS IN WHICH IT COULD BE HANDLED. KHLESTOV INDICATED HE WOULD NOT

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PURSUE THE ISSUE FURTHER. HE HAD MERELY RAISED THE QUESTION IN ORDER TO HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ALLIED POSITION.

27. US REP SAID HE ASSUMED KHLESTOV WOULD WISH TO MAKE SOME GENERAL REMARKS ON THIS OCCASION AND IF SO, ALLIES WOULD BE PREPARED TO LISTEN TO THEM. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD PREFER IF ALLIED REPS WOULD CONTINUE WITH THEIR OWN PRESENTATION. US REP AGREED AND CONTINUED HIS REMARKS, DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS PREVIOUSLY AGREED BY THE AD HOC GROUP.

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FROM US REP MBFR

28. US REP SAID THAT AT THE PREVIOUS INFORMAL SESSION, KHLESTOV HAD REVIEWED POINTS OF COMMON GROUND BETWEEN BOTH SIDES AS HE SAW THEM. WESTERN REPS FOUND THIS TYPE OF ANALYSIS CONSTRUCTIVE AND USEFUL. US REP SAID THAT, IN PRESENT SESSION, HE WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW CERTAIN OF THE POINTS OF COMMON GROUND WHICH ALLIES FOR THEIR PART BELIEVED HAD EMERGED FROM THE PAST FOUR WEEKS OF INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS.

29. FIRST, AS REGARDS PROCEDURE, US REP SAID BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THESE INFORMAL SESSIONS HAD BEEN USEFUL. THEY HAD DEVELOPED ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES. THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN BUSINESSLIKE. BOTH SIDES HAD LEARNED A GOOD DEAL OF VALUABLE BACKGROUND WHICH WOULD SERVE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FUTURE.

30. US REP CONTINUED THAT, AS REGARDS SUBSTANCE, IT WOULD
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APPEAR THAT BOTH SIDES AGREED ON A CENTRAL ISSUE: THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF TAKING STEPS TO MAKE CONFLICT, INCLUDING NUCLEAR CONFLICT, LESS LIKELY, AND THE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS PROVIDED TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THIS OBJECTIVE. WESTERN REPS BELIEVED THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS HAD ALSO SHOWN THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME COMMON GROUND BETWEEN BOTH SIDES WITH RESPECT TO PHASING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ON ANOTHER POINT, THE EASTERN CONCEPT OF AN OVERALL CEILING ON THE FORCES OF EACH SIDE, COMBINED WITH LIMITATION ON RE-ENTRY OF WITHDRAWN FORCES, MIGHT ALSO PROVE USEFUL.

31. US REP COMMENTED THAT ALLIES CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WAS COMMON GROUND BETWEEN BOTH SIDES. UNDER THIS HEADING, THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME FURTHER ELEMENTS WHERE COMMON GROUND COULD BE DEVELOPED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE MAGNITUDE OF SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCIONS ENVISAGED BOTH UNDER THE WESTERN PHASE I PROPOSAL AND UNDER THE EASTERN APPROACH APPEARED SIMILAR. MOREOVER, BOTH SIDES APPEARED TO HAVE RECOGNIZED THE NECISSITY OF RESPECTING THE AGREED CEILING RESULTING FROM A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT. BOTH SIDES APPEARED TO RECOGNIZE THE DESIRABILITY OF FINDING SOME PRACTICAL WAY TO DEAL WITH THE CONTINUING NEED OF THE US AND USSR TO ROTATE, REPLACE AND EXERCISE THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA. AN ADDITIONAL COMMON POINT WAS THAT BOTH SIDES SEEMED TO WISH TO COME TO PRACTICAL RESULTS IN THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS WAY. EASTERN REPS HAD PROPOSED THAT AN AGREEMENT BE REACHED IF POSSIBLE BY 1975. ALLIES TOO WERE PREPARED TO WORK TOWARD THIS.

32. US REP SAID THAT, IN LIGHT OF THIS DESIRE TO MOVE AHEAD, ANOTHER COMMON POINT HAD EMERGED IN RECENT WEEKS, NAMELY, THE REALIZATION, NOW SHARED BY BOTH SIDES, THAT THE PRIORITY PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED NOW WAS THE PROBLEM OF WHAT SPECIFIC LIMITED STEPS SHOULD BE IN ORDER TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD IN A PRACTICAL SENSE. AS ALLIES SAW IT, BOTH SIDES WERE ACTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS REALIZATION AND WERE TRYING TO DEFINE SOME WORKABLE FIRST STEP.

33. IN RECENT SESSIONS, US REP CONTINUED, EASTERN REPS HAD SUGGESTED THAT PARTICIPANTS COULD DISCUSS THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS

CONCEPT, WHICH WAS EASTERN RECOMMENDATION FOR A FIRST STEP.

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HOWEVER, ASSUMING THAT THE COMMON OBJECTIVE WAS TO DEFINE A SMALL FIRST STEP ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES, THE ESSENTIAL METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTY WITH EASTERN SUGGESTION TO CONSIDER THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL AS A FIRST TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION WAS THAT IT RAISED TOO MANY FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES FROM THE OUTSIDE. ALLIES REPS HAD MADE CLEAR TO EASTERN REPS THAT ALLIES OBJECTED TO THE SYMBOLIC PROPOSAL ON FOUR MAIN GROUNDS: (A) IT WOULD ENSHRINE THE PRESENT INEQUITABLE RELATIONSHIP OF GROUND FORCES; (B) IT WOULD REQUIRE PARTICIPATION FROM THE OUTSET BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS; (C) IT WOULD INCLUDE AIR FORCES; AND (D) IT WOULD INCLUDE NUCLEAR FORCES.

34. US REP SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT ONE COULD NOT AVOID ALL CONTENTIOUS ISSUES IN SEEKING TO DEFINE A FIRST SMALL STEP WHICH WOULD BREAK THE ICE AND MOVE BOTH SIDES INTO ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD FIND A FIRST STEP WHERE THE RANGE OF CONTENTIOUS ISSUES WAS NARROWER THAN IN EASTERN SYMBOLIC PROPOSAL AND WHERE THERE WERE FEWER OF THEM. THE ALLIED SUGGESTION MEET THESE REQUIREMENTS WAS THAT BOTH SIDES SEPARATE THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST FROM ALL OTHER ISSUES HAVING TO DO WITH REDUCTIONS AND THAT PARTICIPANTS GIVE PRIORITY TO SOLVING THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST. FOLLOWING THIS COURSE WOULD PERMIT BOTH SIDES TO SET ASIDE FOR LATER TREATMENT ALL OF THESE OTHER ISSUES. NATURALLY, THESE OTHER ISSUES WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH BECAUSE THEY WERE THE CORE PROBLEMS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT FOR THAT VERY REASON, ONE COULD NOT REALISTICALLY EXPECT THEM TO BE RESOLVED AT THE OUTSET. THE PRESENT TASK IN THESE INFORMAL SESSIONS WAS TO DEFINE A MORE MODEST FIRST STEP.

35. US REP SAID BOTH SIDES SHOULD NARROW DOWN THE ISSUE AND GIVE FIRST PRIORITY TO SOLVING THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST. ALLIES HAD TOLD EASTERN REPS THAT THE ONLY PRACTICAL WAY TO AN EXPEDITIOUS OUTCOME OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WAS T
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WOULD HAVE AN ACTUAL OUTCOME DID NOT SEEM REALISTIC TO WESTERN REPS: AFTER A FIRST PHASE OF NEGOTIATION HAD BROUGHT A SUCCESSFUL AND SUBSTANTIAL OUTCOME, IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT POLITICAL AND PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE REASSURED AS TO ITS PRESENT CONCERNS AND INSISTENT ON THE CONTINUATION OF THE PROCESS OF REDUCTIONS. US REP SAID BOTH SIDES SHOULD IN THE COMING WEEKS FOCUS ON RESOLVING THIS QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FIRST AND THEN TURN TO THE ISSUE OF THE CONTENT OF REDUCTIONS THEMSELVES.

37. PRESENTATION OF THESE POINTS BY US REP GAVE RISE TO EXTENSIVE INTERNAL DISCUSSION AMONG THE EASTERN REPS. KHLESTOV FINALLY REQUESTED BREAK FOR CONSULTATION. FOLLOWING BREAK, KHLESTOV SAID EASTERN REPS HAD LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO US REP'S SUMMING UP. HE WOULD LIKE TO DO THE SAME AT A LATER POINT IN THE PROCEEDINGS. IN THE MEANWHILE, HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK SOME QUESTIONS

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ABOUT US REP'S REMARKS SINCE SOME OF THE WESTERN FORMULATIONS HAD BEEN SO "REFINED AND CRAFTY" THAT EASTERN REPS WHO WERE JUST "COMMON MEN", WOULD LIKE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR NATURE. KHLESTOV SAID SOME OF REMARKS MADE BY US REP HAD BEEN DIFFICULT TO FOLLOW, BUT THEIR ESSENCE HAD BEEN THAT, IN VIEW OF THE FOUR DIFFICULTIES US REP HAD MENTIONED WITH REGARD TO THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD FIND A WAY TO AVOID THESE DIFFICULTIES. US REP HAD THEN SUGGESTED THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD SEPARATE THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES WERE TO BE REDUCED FIRST FROM ALL ISSUES HAVING TO DO WITH REDUCTIONS AND CONCENTRATE ON RESOLVING THIS QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. KHLESTOV

COMMENTED THAT, AS FAR AS HE COULD SEE, THIS CONCEPT WAS NOT A NEW IDEA ON THE PART OF ALLIED REPS. ALLIED REPS HAD PRESENTED THIS IDEA ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN THEY HAD SUGGESTED THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES. ALLIED IDEA FROM THE BEGINNING HAD BEEN TO START WITH THE ISSUE OF US-SOVIET FORCES AND THEN TO MOVE TO OTHER ISSUES. DID ALLIED REPS NOW HAVE IN MIND THIS SAME IDEA OF REDUCING ONLY US AND SOVIET FORCES, OR WERE THEY WILLING TO DISCUSS THE REDUCTION OF OTHER FORCES?

38. US REP SAID THAT THE ALLIES HAD IN MIND THE FIRST CASE, THEIR TWO-PHASE APPROACH, WITH US-SOVIET FORCES REDUCED IN THE FIRST PHASE AND OTHERS IN A SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTIONS.

39. FRG REP SAID THE MAIN POINT OF THE ALLIED PROPOSAL WAS TO FIND A FIRST STEP IN ORDER TO MOVE AHEAD. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS, APPARENTLY AIMED AT THE SAME OBJECTIVE, HAD ENTAILED FOR MAIN DIFFICULTIES. THE PRESENT ALLIED SUGGESTION WAS TO ISOLATE ONE DIFFICULT ISSUE AND LEAVE THE OTHERS ASIDE. ONE COULD NOT TACKLE ALL THE DIFFICULTIES IN ONE STROKE.

40. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT, FROM THE BEGINNING, THE WESTERN POSITION HAD BEEN THAT ONLY US AND SOVIET FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, WHEREAS THE EASTERN POSITION WAS THAT ALL FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. SO THAT WHEN THE ALLIES SUGGESTED THAT ONE SHOULD DISCUSS SEPARATELY AND WITH PRIORITY THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST, THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE ALLIED REPS NOW HAD IN MIND SOME COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE TWO OPPOSING POSITIONS. US REP SAID THAT ALLIED REPS HAD TRIED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE ONLY PRACTICAL

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AND REALISTIC WAY TO THE REDUCTION OF FORCES OF OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WAS AFTER REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES.

41. EASTERN REPS HAD FURTHER DISCUSSION AMONG THEMSELVES AT THE TABLE. SMIRNOVSKY THEN SAID THAT US REP'S ANSWER TO HIS QUESTION INDICATED THAT THE WESTERN POSITION WAS THE SAME AS AT THE OUTSET. DID THE ALLIES HAVE IN MIND REDUCTION OF ONLY TWO FORCES AT THE OUTSET? US REP SAID THAT THIS WAS A FACT. HOWEVER, IF THE EAST AGREED TO THE TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION JUST PROPOSED BY THE ALLIED REPS, PARTICIPANTS COULD DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF WHAT FORCES COULD BE REDUCED FIRST AND ALSO THE RELATED ISSUE OF PROBLEMS WHICH AROSE FOR THE EAST FROM THE ALLIED PHASING CONCEPT. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THE PARTICIPANTS HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE SO LONG, WHAT WAS THE POINT IN REPEATING THE WHOLE PROCESS?

42. US REP SAID THERE WERE ADVANTAGES IN FOCUSING ON THIS ISSUE, WHICH WAS AN ISSUE OF IMPORTANCE TO BOTH SIDES. IF IT COULD BE RESOLVED, THIS WOULD LEAD TO PROGRESS. GDR REP SAID THAT

SINCE ALL ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATION WERE INTER-RELATED, THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THIS ALLIED POSITION CONTAINED ANY HINT OF A NEW APPROACH. THE FRG REP SAID THERE WERE AFTER ALL TWO DIVERGENT POSITIONS ON THE ISSUE OF WHICH FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST. THIS PROBLEM HAD TO BE DISCUSSED AND RESOLVED AT SOME POINT. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THERE WOULD BE SOME POINT IN ACCEPTING THIS PROPOSAL ONLY IF THERE WERE SOME NEW ELEMENT IN IT, AND SOME ASSURANCE THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD NOT SIMPLY REPEAT THEIR PREVIOUS POSITIONS. US REP SAID THAT IF EAST WERE WILLING TO GIVE PRIORITY TO THE QUESTION HE HAD DEFINED, EASTERN REPS COULD TELL ALLIED REPS WHAT PROBLEMS THEY SAW

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ARISING FROM NOT HAVING ALL FORCES REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

43. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT THERE

WAS WHICH WAS NEW IN THE ALLIED APPROACH. PREVIOUSLY, THE ALLIED POSITION HAD BEEN THAT ONE SHOULD START WITH THE ISSUES OF US AND SOVIET FORCES FIRST AND PUT ASIDE REDUCTIONS OF OTHER FORCES. WAS THERE SOMETHING NEW IN THE PRESENT FORMULATION? US REP SAID THE ALLIES HAD NOT CHANGED THEIR POSITION. THEY WERE MERELY SUGGESTING A DIFFERENT FOCUS ON THE SUBJECT MATTER, A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT WAY OF PROCEEDING IN ORDER TO CONCENTRATE ON THE QUESTION OF WHO REDUCES FIRST AND WHAT PROBLEMS THE ALLIED POSITION ON THE SUBJECT GAVE TO THE EAST.

44. EASTERN REPS REQUESTED A SECOND BREAK FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION. ON THEIR RETURN, KHLESTOV SAID EASTERN REPS HAD BEEN TRYING
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TO FORMULATE THE ISSUE RAISED BY THE US REP. APPARENTLY, THE PROPOSAL WAS TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF AT WHICH POINT SHOULD POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS BEGIN THEIR REDUCTIONS. IF THIS FORMULATION WERE ADOPTED, THIS WOULD MEAN THAT IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSING IT, THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE FREE TO ARGUE EITHER FOR ALL 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE OUTSET OR THAT 2, 3 OR MORE SHOULD LEAD OFF. US REP SAID THIS REPRESENTED THE SPIRIT OF WHAT HE HAD SAID, BUT HE BELIEVED THE DEFINITION HE HAD USED, AS TO WHO SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET AND WHAT PROBLEMS WERE CAUSED BY ALLIED APPROACH ON PHASING FOR THE EAST, WAS A BETTER FORMULATION. KHLESTOV SAID EASTERN REPS COULD NOT ACCEPT ALLIED FORMULATION ABOUT WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST, BECAUSE THE FORMULATION WAS SUCH THAT IT PRECLUDED THE POSSIBILITY OF ALL REDUCING FROM THE OUTSET AND HENCE WOULD MEAN ABANDONMENT OF THE EASTERN POSITION. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD PREFER A FORMULATION ON THE FOLLOWING LINES: "THE QUESTION OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS." THW WOULD BE ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE QUESTION MAY BE DISCUSSED AS TO WHETHER ALL OR ONLY SOME WOULD REDUCE. EACH SIDE COULD PRESENT ITS VIEWS AND PARTICIPANTS COULD SEEK A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION.

45. ALLIED REPS REQUESTED A BREAK FOR CONSULTATION TO CONSIDER THIS FORMULATION. UPON RETURN US REP SAID ALLIED REPS WOULD PREFER A FORMULATION TO THE EFFECT THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO SOLVING THE QUESTION OF "WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET". US REP EXPLAINED THAT ALLIES WOULD SUGGEST PHRASING THE QUESTION SUBSTANTIALLY AS KHLESTOV HAD, BUT WITH SLIGHT CHANGES BECAUSE KHLESTOV HAD, AMONG OTHER THINGS, RAISED THE ISSUE OF ARMAMENTS, WHICH SHOULD BE EXCLUDED. THE QUESTION "WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET?" WOULD NOT PREJUDICE THE OUTCOME. IT COMPREHENDED ALL POSSIBILITIES, THAT US AND SOVIET FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, OR THAT ALL FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. HENCE, IT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE

POSITION OF EITHER SIDE.

46. KHLESTOV INSISTED THAT THE FORMULA MEANT OF ITS VERY NATURE THAT SOME FORCES WOULD NOT BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET AND WAS THEREFORE NOT A NEUTRAL FORMULATION.

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US REP SAID THAT THE FORMULATION THAT HE HAD ADVANCED WAS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE EASTERN POSITION ON THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE OR THE WESTERN POSITION ON THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE, OR TO THE POSITIONS OF EITHER SIDE AS REGARDED OTHER ASPECTS OF REDUCTIONS. AND THIS COULD BE SPECIFIED. ALLIED REPS WERE NOT TRYING TO BE TRICKY, BUT TO MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO DEFINE ONE OF THE OPEN QUESTIONS WHICH ALL PARTICIPANTS HAD OFTEN RECOGNIZED DURING THE PAST 8 SESSIONS TO BE A MAJOR ISSUE, AND TO AGREE TO FOCUS ON SOLVING IT.

47. KHLESTOV SAID PERHAPS THE ISSUE COULD BE SETTLED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: EASTERN REPS SAW SOME ELEMENTS IN THE ALLIED FORMULATION WHICH DID NOT SUIT THEM ENTIRELY, BUT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD AGREE NOT TO ARGUE WORDING FURTHER. HE WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT THE FORMULATION AND TO PROCEED WITH IT, ON THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ALLIES WOULD NOT SEEK TO MAKE USE OF THIS FORMULATION TO CLAIM THAT THE EAST HAD CHANGED ITS POSITION. THE EASTERN REPS ACCEPTED THIS LANGUAGE FOR THE PURPOSES OF INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHEN THESE DISCUSSIONS WOULD BEGIN BUT THIS COULD BE SETTLED LATER. BUT THIS WOULD BE ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS FORMULATION WAS NOT TO BE REFERRED TO IN PLENARY SESSIONS OF IN INFORMAL SESSIONS IN ORDER TO PROVE ANY SPECIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREED DOCUMENTS, OR IN SUPPORT OF ANY SPECIAL POSITION WHICH HAD BEEN ADVANCED IN THE TALKS HERETOFORE. US REP SAID THAT THE FORMULATION WOULD BE ACCEPTED AS A BASIS OF DISCUSSION WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITION OF EITHER SIDE. KHLESTOV ASKED WHETHER DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT SHOULD START NOW, OR ON SOME FUTURE OCCASION. US REP SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF EASTERN REPS COULD LEAD OFF BY TELLING ALLIED REPS WHAT PROBLEMS THEY HAD WITH THE IDEA OF REDUCING US AND SOVIET FORCES FIRST. THIS COULD BE DONE ON THE PRESENT OCCASION OR ON THE NEXT ONE. IT WOULD IN ANY EVENT BE HELPFUL TO HAVE SUCH AN EXPRESSION OF EASTERN VIEWS.

48. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, IN THAT CASE, HE WOULD START THE PROCESS IMMEDIATELY. HIS REMARKS MIGHT NOT BE PRECISE, BUT HE WOULD MENTION THE BASIC CONSIDERATIONS. THE QUESTION WAS, WHY DID THE EAST THINK IT WOULD BE WRONG, INEQUITABLE AND UNFAIR TO BEGIN BY REDUCING US AND SOVIET FORCES ALONE? US REP SAID IF THE EAST'S DIFFICULTIES AS REGARDS THE

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ISSUE OF PHASING HAD TO BE SOLVED, KHLESTOV SHOULD NOT STATE THEM IN A WAY WHICH MADE IT HARDER TO FIND A SOLUTION. KHLESTOV RESPONDED THAT ALLIES REPS WERE FAMILIAR WITH EASTERN ARGUMENTS ON THIS TOPIC. THEY WERE AS FOLLOWS: FIRST, THE EAST PROCEEDED FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE MILITARY GROUPINGS OF NATO ON THE ONE SIDE AND THE WARSAW PACT ON THE OTHER WERE COMPOSED OF BOTH FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES ON BOTH SIDES. THEREFORE, TO SINGLE OUT ONLY THE GROUND FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION FOR REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT BE

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OBJECTIVE AND WOULD GIVE THE WEST A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.
NEXT, THE RATIO OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND

THE US TO THE TOTAL FORCES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIANCES IN THE AREA WAS NOT EQUAL, NOR WAS THE ABSOLUTE NUMBER OF US AND SOVIET FORCES EQUAL. THEREFORE, REDUCTION BY ANY EQUAL PERCENTAGE OF THESE TWO FORCES ALONE AT THE OUTSET WOULD PUT THE EAST AT A DISADVANTAGE FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF REDUCTIONS.

49. KHLESTOV WENT ON TO SAY THAT, EVEN IF THERE WERE AN EQUAL NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS FOR US AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA, THIS WOULD NONETHELESS LEAD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LIMITS ON US AND USSR FORCES WITHIN THE AREA, SO THAT THE USSR WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO INCREASE IT FORCES IN THE AREA. BUT OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS LIKE THE FRG WAND UK WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE AGREEMENT AND WOULD HAVE THE CONTINUED RIGHT TO INCREASE THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ACT AS THEY LIKED.

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50. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT THE THIRD INEQUITABLE ELEMENT OF THE WESTERN PHASE I PROPOSAL WAS THAT IT ENTAILED DIFFERENT TYPES OF REDUCTIONS FOR SOVIET AND FOR AMERICAN FORCES. THE ALLIES WANTED TO LEAVE THE US WITH FREEDOM OF CHOICE AS REGARDS WITHDRAWAL BY UNITS OF INDIVIDUALS, WHEREAS THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW UNITS WITH HEAVY EQUIPMENT. THE ALLIES JUSTIFIED THIS POSITION WITH GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES. EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT GEOGRAPHY COULD NOT BE TAKEN AS A BASIS. FROM THIS POSITION ALONE ONE COULD CLEARLY SEE THE ENEQUITIES OF THE WESTERN APPROACH AS REGARDS REDUCTION OF EQUIPMENT BY SOVIET FORCES AND BY AMERICAN FORCES, WHO WOULD REDUCE NONE.

51. KHLESTOV SAID A FORTH NEGATIVE ELEMNT OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS THAT THE ALLIES WISHED ONLY TO REDUCE GROUND FORCES OF THE US AND USSR. THE EAST WANTED TO REDUCE AIR FORCES AND UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR ARMS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE PROCESS OF REDUCTIONS. NEXT, THE MAIN EASTERN POINT WAS THAT REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA SHOULD TAKE PLACE ONLY IF UK AND FRG FORCES WERE ALSO REDUCED. EASTERN PUBLIC OPINION WAS PERFECTLY AWARE OF THE FACT THAT OVER 75 PERCENT OF THE NATO FORCES IN THE AREA WERE COMPOSED OF NATIONAL FORCES, THE FRG, UK AND OTHERS. SO, EASTERN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY ONLY THE FORCES OF THE US AND USSR WOULD BE REDUCED IN AN AGREEMENT WHILE OTHERS WOULD NOT BE REDUCED. MOREOVER, THE REMAINING FORCES WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO INCREASE FREELY. THE SAME WOULD BE TRUE AS REGARDS THE RIGHT TO INCREASE NUCLEAR ANE AIR FORCES IF ONLY GROUND FORCES WERE REDUCED.

52. KHLESTOV SAID THAT AS FAR AS THE QUESTION OF THE RETURN OF WITHDRAWN FORCES TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WAS CONCERNED, THE BASIC EASTERN APPROACH WAS THAT, ONCE FORCES WERE WITHDRAWN FROM THE AREA, THEY COULD NOT BE RETURNED. ALLIED REPS

HAD BEEN SUGGESTING ON THE PAST FEW OCCASIONS THAT SOME TROOPS MIGHT BE RETURNED. THIS WAS A POSSIBILITY, BUT THE EAST HAD A DIFFERENT APPROACH.

53. KHLESTOV SAID ALLIES REPS HAD CLAIMED TO EASTERN REPS THAT THE PROCESS OF REDUCING US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD BE SIMPLER AND CREATE LESS DIFFICULTIES THAN REDUCING OTHER
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FORCES. HE HAD ALREADY INDICATE SOME PROBLEMS THE EAST HAD WITH THIS CONCEPT. IN THE MOST RECENT PLENARY STATEMENT BY THE US REP, LATTER HAD SAID THERE SHOULD BE WHAT HE CALLED STABILIZING MEASURES AND THAT THESE SHOULD BE APPLIED ONLY TO THE US AND USSR FORCES. THIS APPROACH HAD COME AS A SURPRISE TO THE EASTERN REPS. IT WAS STRANGE TO THEM THAT, IF SUCH STABILIZING MEASURES AS THE WEST CALLED THEM WERE OF ANY VALUE, THEY SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO THE REMAINING FORCES IN THE AREA. THIS WAS ILLOGICAL. KHLESTOV SAID THESE WERE THE MAIN POINTS HE WOULD LIKE TO ADVANCE AT THIS TIME ON THE SUBJECT AS DEFINED.

54. US REP THANKED KHLESTOV. AS HE UNDERSTOOD THE POINTS JUST MADE BY KHLESTOV, THERE WERE ESSENTIALLY ONLY TWO WHICH RELATED TO THE PRECISE ISSUE IT HAD JUST BEEN AGREED TO DISCUSS, "WHOSE FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET". THE FIRST OF THESE OBJECTIONS WAS THAT, IF US AND SOVIET FORCES WERE SINGLED OUT FOR INITIAL REDUCTION, THEY WOULD BECOME SUBJECT TO CEILINGS AND OTHER FORCES IN THE AREA WOULD NOT BE, AND THIS KHLESTOV FELT WOULD GIVE NATO AN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE BECAUSE SOVIET FORCES WERE ONE-HALF OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES WHEREAS US FORCES WERE ONE-QUARTER OF THOSE OF NATO. THE SECOND MAJOR PROBLEM RAISED BY KHLESTOV WHICH WAS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE QUESTION OF WHICH FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET WAS THE POINT THAT EASTERN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY A PHASE I AGREEMENT DEALT ONLY WITH US AND SOVIET FORCES AND LEFT OUT 75 PERCENT OF NATO FORCES. SOVIET REP HAD MENTIONED TWO OTHER DIFFICULTIES EAST HAD WITH THE WESTERN APPROACH, BUT HE WOULD PROBABLY AGREE THAT THESE RELATED TO OTHER ISSUES OF REDUCTIONS, NAMELY THE SHAPE OF REDUCTIONS AND WHETHER AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED. KHLESTOV INDICATED THAT HE ACCEPTED THAT HIS OTHER POINTS WERE RELATED TO THE METHOD OF REDUCTIONS.

55. US REP SAID, AS A CONSEQUENCE, KHLESTOV HAD LEFT ALLIED REPS WITH TWO PROBLEMS TO CONSIDER WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. WITH RESPECT TO THE SECOND ISSUE, ALLIES REPS HAD TRIED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE SITUATION OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE US AND USSR. REDUCTION OF FORCES OF THE

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LATTER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD AFFECT ONLY A PORTION OF THEIR FORCES. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION AND ONE WHICH PUBLIC OPINION IN ALL COUNTRIES WOULD UNDERSTAND. MOREOVER, THIS PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING WOULD BE HELPED BY PROVISION THAT THE ALLIES WOULD FORESEE IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT THAT WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCES WOULD BE DEALT WITH BY A SECOND NEGOTIATION STARTING WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME. THIS WOULD BE AGREED TO BY ALL THE PARTIES.

56. KHLESTOV SAID HE HAD GIVEN ALLIED REPS TWO MAIN ARGUMENTS AND AGREED THAT THESE WERE THE MAIN POINTS WHICH SHOWED THAT PROCEEDING WITH US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET AND LEAVING THE OTHERS WOULD NOT BRING AN EQUITABLE RESULT IN THE VIEW OF THE EAST.

57. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD NOW LIKE TO SUMMARIZE THE COURSE
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OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THUS FAR SINCE THE NEXT INFORMAL MEETING WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE ISSUE OF DEFINING FORCES. ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD AGREE THAT THE INFORMAL SESSIONS WERE USEFUL FOR OBTAINING A DEEPER AND BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES. HE THOUGHT A SECOND POSITIVE POINT WAS THAT THE PARTICIPANTS IN THESE INFORMAL SESSIONS HAD CREATED A GOOD ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE AND TRUST WHICH WOULD BE OF GREAT USE IN DISCUSSING ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FUTURE.

58. KHLESTOV SAID THE OVERALL EASTERN APPRAISAL WAS THAT, OVER THE LAST THREE MONTHS OF NEGOTIATION, TWO WIDELY DIFFERING PLANS FOR REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE HAD EMERGED. IT WOULD BE DESIREABLE TO COMPARE THESE TWO PLANS FROM THE OBJECTIVE OF REINFORCING DETENTE THROUGH MILITARY DETENTE AND THE PURPOSES AGREED BY PARTICIPANTS WHO WERE GATHERED IN VIENNA. EASTERN REPS BELIEVED WESTERN PLAN HAD A NUMBER OF SERIOUS DRAWBACKS AND COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AS A WAY TO BRING ABOUT REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. EASTERN REPS DID NOT WISH TO INJURE THE FEELINGS OF ALLIED REPS. THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT ALLIED REPS HAD WORKED FOR SOME TIME WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NATO TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF THEIR OWN PLAN. BUT, IN PAST EFFORTS TO DISCUSS AND CRITICIZE THE WESTERN PLAN, EASTERN REPS HAD POINTED TO A NUMBER OF ILLOGICAL AND INEQUITABLE ELEMENTS IT CONTAINED. SINCE ALLIED REPS WERE THE AUTHORS OF THEIR PLAN, THEY MIGHT BE IT INTELLECTUAL PRISONERS. HE WOULD ASK ALLIES TO CONSIDER THE ALLIED APPROACH FROM THE OUTSIDE IN AN OBJECTIVE WAY IN ORDER TO GAIN A WIDER PERSPECTIVE.

59. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT THE WHOLE OF THE WESTERN PLAN RESTED ON DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES. AND THIS WAS THE ONLY THING IN THE ENTIRE MILITARY SITUATION THE ALLIES WANTED TO CHANGE. THIS WAS A DEBATABLE AND EVEN AN UNFOUNDED CONCEPT. DURING THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS, ALL PARTICIPANTS HAD REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT ONE COULD NOT MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OR EVALUATION OF ARMED FORCES ON THE BASIS OF ONE ELEMENT ALONE. TO APPRAISE OR ESTIMATE THE COMPLETE CAPABILITY OF THE FORCES INVOLVED IN CENTRAL EUROPE, IT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE MILITARY ELEMENTS ON BOTH SIDES IN THE AREA. IF ONE ADDRESSED THIS QUESTION TO ANY GENERAL STAFF, THEY WOULD SAY THAT ANY EVALUATION OF THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES

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OF ANY MILITARY ALLIANCE HAS TO BE BASED ON TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF FORCES OF THAT ALLIANCE. THE WESTERN APPROACH WAS NOT A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH. TO THE CONTRARY, IT WAS AN ARTIFICIAL APPROACH,

ONE DESIGNED TO CHANGE THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES.

60. THE JOINT GOAL OF THE PARTICIPANTS AS SPECIFIED IN THE COMMUNIQUE WAS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. BUT, AS A MATTER OF FACT, EXCLUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM REDUCTIONS COULD HARDLY BE UNDERSTOOD BY PUBLIC OPINION AS CONTRIBUTING TO SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE SAME WAS TRUE FOR THE EXCLUSION OF AIR FORCES FROM THE REDUCTIONS. THE AIR FORCE WAS THE MOST OFFENSIVE ARM--EVERYONE WANTED IT REDUCED--AND THE MOST DANGEROUS ELEMENT OF ARMED FORCES. THE THEORY THAT NUCLEAR WAR WOULD START ONLY WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WAS AN UNFOUNDED CONCEPT. EVEN IF IT WERE ONLY WRONG BY 10 PER CENT, IT COULD NOT BE TAKEN AS A BASIS FOR SUBSEQUENT CONCLUSIONS OR DECISIONS.

61. KHLESTOV SAID A FURTHER REASON WHY A PARTICULAR KIND OF FORCE COULD NOT BE SINGLED OUT FOR REDUCTIONS WAS BECAUSE PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED THAT THE STRUCTURE OF ARMED FORCES ON BOTH SIDES WAS DIFFERENT. THE AGREEMENT JUST REACHED TO SEEK A COMMON DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES EVIDENCED THIS POINT SO THAT ONE COULD NOT SINGLE OUT GROUND FORCES, AND THE CONCEPT ON WHICH THE ALLIES HAD BASED THEIR TWO-PHASE APPROACH WERE DEBATABLE ON SEVERAL COUNTS. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD LOOK FOR A MOMENT AT THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF THE TWO-PHASE NEGOTIATIONS STARTING WITH REDUCTION OF MAJOR SOVIET FORCES PLUS THEIR EQUIPMENT AND HALF THIS AMOUNT OF US FORCES WITHOUT ANY EQUIPMENT. THE MAJOR ARGUMENT USED BY ALLIED REPS TO DEFEND THIS APPROACH WAS GEOGRAPHICAL DISPARITIES, BUT EASTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT THAT THIS ARGUMENT WAS DEBATABLE.

62. KHLESTOV SAID A SECOND EFFECT OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS THAT THE SIX OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT COVERED BY REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET, EVEN THOUGH THIS WAS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE FOR THE EAST. SO FAR, ALLIED REPS HAD FAILED TO EXPLAIN WHEN AND HOW THESE COUNTRIES WOULD REDUCE.

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

NOT MOVE TO THE COMMON CEILING FROM THE START. THE EASTERN REPS HAD NOT YET RECEIVED ANY REPLY AS TO WHETHER, AT THE TIME OF REDUCTION OF THE US AND SOVIET FORCES, THERE WOULD BE A FREEZE ON THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. IT WOULD NOT BE CORRECT TO ARGUE THAT THE LOCAL CONSEQUENCES FOR THE US AND USSR OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WERE LESS THAN THOSE FOR OTHER FORCES IN THE AREA. FOR EXAMPLE, GREAT BRITAIN MIGHT WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM THE AREA, BUT IT WOULD ALSO HAVE THE RIGHT TO BRING THEM BACK. THIS RAISED THE QUESTION OF "FOREIGN" TROOPS. THESE INCLUDED UK, BELGIUM, CANADA AND THE NETHERLANDS. AFTER ALL, THE UK WAS A MAJOR POWER AND FOREIGN TO THE AREA.

63. KHLESTOV SAID THESE OBJECTIONS COULD BE CONTINUED, BUT IN GENERAL, THE EASTERN REPS HAD THE FEELING THAT, IN THE WESTERN PLAN, ALLIES WERE TRYING TO SINGLE OUT ONE SINGLE

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ELEMENT FOR REDUCTIONS, GROUND FORCES, AND TRYING TO CHANGE THE OVERALL BALANCE FOR FORCES IN THE AREA.

64. READING FROM A NEWSPAPER ARTICLE, KHLESTOV SAID THAT U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER HAD MADE A STATEMENT AT A RECENT LUNCH WITH SOVIET LEADERS SAYING THAT IF EITHER THE US OR USSR TRIED TO SEEK ADVANTAGE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER, NOTHING GOOD WOULD COME OF THIS EFFORT, BUT WITH A JOINT POSITION ONE COULD MOVE AHEAD.

65. KHLESTOV SAID THIS TOO WAS THE EASTERN POSITION. WESTERN PLAN CONTAINED MANY DRAWBACKS. AS FAR AS THE EASTERN PLAN WAS CONCERNED, ALLIED REPS WOULD EVENTUALLY SEE

THAT IT WAS EQUITABLE TO ALL PARTICIPANTS IN EVERY FIELD. ALL FORCES WERE COVERED AND THE PERCENTAGE OF REDUCTIONS WAS EQUITABLE. BECAUSE THIS APPROACH WAS EQUITABLE, IT WAS A JUSTIFIED ONE.

66. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, IN CONSEQUENCE, HIS RECOMMENDATION TO ALLIED REPS WOULD BE THAT THEY SHOULD CONSIDER ALL OF THE ARGUMENTS EAST HAD ADVANCED SO FAR AND CONSIDER THE EASTERN PROPOSAL ON ITS OWN MERITS. IF ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WANTED TO MAKE PROGRESS AND TO ACHIEVE POSITIVE RESULTS, THEY SHOULD THINK OF WAYS OF HOW TO PRECEED IN THE FUTURE. ALLIED REPS HAD CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS A COMMON ELEMENT IN THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT AND THE WESTERN APPROACH IN THAT BOTH SIDES WERE PREPARED TO REDUCE THE GROUND FORCES OF THE US AND USSR. THIS WAS AN INACCURATE STATEMENT, BECAUSE IT WAS UNTHINKABLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO REDUCE ITS FORCES WITHOUT THE INCLUSION OF THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. IF ONE ARBITRARILY PICKED OUT MERELY SOME OTHER INDIVIDUAL FORCE ELEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, HELICOPTERS, AND ARGUED THAT THERE WAS COMMON GROUND THAT HELICOPTERS SHOULD BE REDUCED BY AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE ON EACH SIDE, WOULD THIS BE A REALISTIC WAY OF DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTION? ONE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL ELEMENTS.

67. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, IF THE PARTICIPANTS REALLY WANTED TO MAKE PROGRESS, THEY HAD TO TAKE A BOLD MOVE FORWARD. THERE WAS A CONVENTIONAL FORM OF WORDS IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS NOT TO CALL ANY PROPOSAL ADVANCED "UNACCEPTABLE." IN TERMS

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OF THAT CONVENTION, HE WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT THE WESTERN PLAN WAS THOROUGHLY "UNPRODUCTIVE." HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ALLIES HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH THE EASTERN PLAN. THEREFORE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD SEEK A FIRST STEP SO THEY COULD MOVE AHEAD. PROGRESS AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BENEFIT NOT ONLY THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS BUT THE OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL. ALLIES REPS CONTINUALLY REFERRED TO PHASES. IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO PURSUE THIS ISSUE FURTHER IN SEMANTIC TERMS. WHETHER IT SHOULD BE CALLED A PHASE OR A STAGE, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TRY TO FIND A FIRST STEP. THE WESTERN ARGUMENT THAT, IF ALL REDUCED AT THE OUTSET, THIS WOULD ENSHRINE THE FORCE DISPARITY SHOULD BE RE-EXAMINED DURING THE RECESS. THIS WAS BECAUSE ANY EVALUATION WHATEVER OF MILITARY STRATEGY WOULD HAVE TO BE ON THE BASIS OF ALL FORCE ELEMENTS. THE QUESTION FOR NOW WAS, IN WHAT DIRECTION COULD PARTICIPANTS MOVE FOR THE FIRST STEP? IT WAS NECESSARY THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. KHLESTOV CONTINUED, "WE COULD CONSIDER THE FORMS FOR THIS REDUCTIONS. IT IS UP TO YOU TO PROPOSE VARIANTS. I AM NOT MAKING ANY SUGGESTIONS IN THIS REGARD. I AM JUST RAISING THE ISSUE FOR YOU TO LOOK AT. WE WANT TO CONSIDER TOGETHER HOW ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD

INDICATE THEIR READINESS TO PROCEED REPEAT PROCEED TO REDUCTIONS."
(COMMENT: KHLESTOV HAS SEVERAL TIMES USED A FORMULATION OF THIS
KIND, BOTH IN PLENARY AND INFORMAL SESSIONS, FIRST STATING AS
A CATEGORICAL NECESSITY THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS MUST REDUCE
FROM THE OUTSET, AND THEN FOLLOWING IT WITH A FORMULATION
WHICH STATES THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS MUST AT THE OUTSET
UNDERTAKE AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE. KHLESTOV'S PRESENT FORMULATION
IS SLIGHTLY MORE FORTHCOMING, SUGGESTING THE POSSIBILITY OF
A JOINT SEARCH FOR THE FORM OF A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE. END
COMMENT.)

68. KHLESTOV SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT A REDUCTION OF MANPOWER
ALONE COULD SERVE AS AN ADEQUATE STANDARD OF MILITARY STRENGTH.
ONE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT MILITARY EQUIPMENT. KHLESTOV THEN STATED,
"I DON'T KNOW WHAT MOSCOW WOULD SAY IF I PROPOSED UNILATERAL
STATEMENTS ON REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR SOME OTHER FORMS."

69. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN DEALING
WITH THESE QUESTIONS OVER THE PAST YEAR. THAT THEY WANTED
TO MAKE PROGRESS THEY SHOULD START SOMEWHERE. HE WOULD ASK
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ALLIES TO USE THE RECESS TO SEE WHAT PRACTICAL STEPS WOULD
BE POSSIBLE, OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE NO PROGRESS AND AFTER
THE RECESS, PARTICIPANTS WOULD STAND JUST WHERE THEY ARE
NOW. ON THE OTHER HAND IF PARTICIPANTS COULD FIND A FIRST
STEP LEADING TO REDUCTION, THIS WOULD LEAD TO FURTHER PROGRESS.
A FIRST STEP WAS NECESSARY TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING REDUCTION OF FOREIGN FORCES. AT PRESENT
READING, ALTHOUGH HE WAS ONLY JOKING, IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT
THE WESTER PROPOSAL RELY SHOULD BE ENTITLED "PROPOSAL FOR
UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS OF FORCES OF THE USSR."

70. US REP THANKED KHLESTOV FOR HIS REMARKS. HE SAID HE BELIEVED
THAT THEY HAD CONFIRMED WHAT US REP HAD SAID AT THE OUTSET,
THAT BOTH SIDES HAD THE SAME OBJECTIVE: HOW TO DEFINE A FIRST
STEP SMALL ENOUGH FOR ALL TO TAKE. AS HE UNDERSTOOD THE INFORMAL
UNDERSTANDING REACHED, BOTH SIDES WOULD PREPARE FOR FURTHER
DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED
FROM THE OUTSET FOR DISCUSSION IN INFORMAL SESSIONS ONLY,
AND BOTH SIDES WOULD LOOK FOR A
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